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Religious Violence Through Lens of Cavanaugh’s Theory: 









The incident of burning houses of Buddhist worship and destruction of ethnic Chinese dwellings in Tanjungbalai occurred 
on 29-30 July 2016. Local communities, regional leaders, security forces and some religious leaders considered this 
incident to be motivated by religious issues and ignored several other factors such as ethnicity, social political economy 
and so on, while many observers-academic, researchers, policy-makers, journalists, NGO workers, political 
commentatirs, among others- argues that religious violence analysis really motivated by material-based political interests, 
socio-economic reason, and others factor of secular ones and dismissed the religious framing of the violence. This research 
is based on Cavanaugh's theory that there is no purely religious or other ideological factor that is seen as dominant for the 
occurrence of violence. This article argues that religion plays a role in conflict dynamics in Tanjungbalai as an 
instrumental reason, but at the same time, attacks on Buddhist temples in Tanjungbalai are complex issues that do not 
purport to reveal the true state of affairs. What is apparent in riot in Tanjungbalai is competition from religion and secular 
factor including competition over public space, socioeconomic status, religious zoning are suggested as reasons why 
violent tension may exist in Tanjungbalai. 
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Introduction  
On July 29-30 2016 an incident burning 
Buddhist temple occurred in one area in South 
Tanjungbalai Subdistrict, Tanjungbalai City caused 
3 monasteries, 8 Pagodas, and 2 offices get a horrible 
damage (Gunawan, 2016). This event is interesting 
to examine from the perspective of religious conflict. 
Because there are indications (as will be explained 
later) that local leaders, from the police and from the 
religious community, have attempted to portray this 
event as a form of criminal behavior, devoid of 
religious, socio-political and racial motivation. We 
know that some members of the community are local 
Malay Muslims and the Chinese Buddhist 
community, however do hold inter-ethnic prejudice. 
We also know that strong economic disparities in 
Tanjungbalai are like controlling economic resources 
by a group of Indonesian Chinese encourage groups 
to gather act violence under religious guise. 
The Discussion begin with an introduction to 
Tanjungbalai’s Democraphic and to the cultural 
settings, giving particular attention to native 
Indonesian people and Chinese culture including the 
acculturation of chinese culture and the position of 
Tanjungbalai as “Islamic City” rather than “Chinese 
city”. It then turns to the wider reading of the 
complexity of the riots includes an examination of 
the political economy of the people of the Muslims 
and Buddhists, the local tension between Chinese 
and Muslim Malay in Tanjungbalai in the broad and 
varied social field of Tanjungbalai. 
How to deal with this such a violence? In the 
discourse of social sciences, conflicts occur because 
of many factors such as religious sentiments, 
material interests, political motivations that interact 
with each other, exaggerating and altering each of the 
effects that may not appear on the surface. There is a 
view that religion has a set of symbols and normative 
ideological values that contain elements of violence 
(Avalos, 2005; Jurgensmeyer, 2000; Kimball, 2002). 
Kimball (2002) identifies signs that can be the reason 
why religion is so important in shaping violence. In 
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line with Kimball, Avalos (2005) argues that religion 
creates new scarcity based on unverifiable criteria or 
illusions. Meanwhile, Juergensmeyer describes very 
systematically how people commit acts of terror 
based on theological and ideological legitimacy 
derived from values in certain religious doctrines. 
The main argument put forward by Jurgensmeyer 
(2000) is that Religion becomes the dominant factor 
that causes violence because in the holy book 
religion and religious traditions there are values and 
doctrines that invite the perpetrators to carry out 
violence on behalf. The most popular idea of 
Jurgensmeyer is the cosmic war.  
While a more moderate view holds that religion 
plays a role in several levels as a trigger for violence 
(Appleby, 2012; Hasenclever & Rittberger, 2000). 
Appleby (2012) divides the three categories (strong 
religion, weak religion, and pathological religion) in 
looking at the evaluation of religion and religious 
agency as a factor that causes violence. Furthermore, 
Andreas Hassenclever and Volker Rittberger (2000) 
are suing important questions that are often 
considered to be established in relation to the 
relationship between religion and violence. They 
argue that the problem when looking at the impact of 
religion on conflict is when religion has its influence. 
To answer this question, Hassenclever and Rittberger 
provide an important perspective on the theory of 
looking at the impact of faith on political conflict 
which is formulated in three main areas, namely 
Primordialist, Instrumentalist and constructivist. 
Primordialists hold that differences in religious 
traditions should be seen as one of the most 
important independent variables to explain the 
interaction of violence within and between nations. 
Instrumentalists conclude that religious violence is 
the result of economic and socio-political injustice. 
When a change in society that leads to a collision is 
a result of the distribution of power and the unjust. 
Constructivist argues that in many situations, 
religion is influenced by an alignment between the 
perpetrator of good and the sinner. In many ways this 
is influenced by the power of religious leaders. 
Constructivists exist between primordialism and 
instrumentalism. It considers social conflict inherent 
in cognitive structures such as ideology, ethnicity, 
religion. 
If the above views emphasizes that in one 
particular condition, religion plays a role or delegates 
the violence. Therefore, the writer considers it 
necessary to propose a new reading with the theory 
put forward by Cavanaugh. According to 
Cavanaugh, the idea of religion has a tendency that 
causes violence is one of the essential constructions 
of religion. The tendency to insulate between 
religious violence and secular violence should be 
avoided because it is unhelpful, misleading, and 
mystifying. Cavanaugh proves that religious 
violence is a myth. William Cavanaugh (2009, p. 17) 
“examine three different, overlaping types of 
arguments for the link between religion and violence, 
and show how the argument fail”. For Cavanaugh 
“there is no reason to suppose thet so-called secular 
ideologies such as nationalism, patriotism, 
capitalism, Marxism and liberalism are any less 
prone to be absolutist, divisive and irrational than in, 
for example, the biblical God” (2009, p. 55). 
I tends to see the issue of violence as a complex 
phenomenon. Nothing can be considered the 
dominant factor in conflict or violence. Especially to 
make religion an irrational reason for violence 
without considering other factors. Such a view tends 
to be essentialist in looking at the causes of religious 
violence. In my opinion, the conclusion of 
Cavanaugh's thesis is relevant to be used in 
questioning the idea of secular and religious 
separation. Cavanaugh concluded that there is no 
difference between secular and religious ideas as a 
cause of violence. So there is the potential for reading 
to the phenomenon of conflict in a broader level. 
The basic assumption of this research confirms 
that religion influences the dynamics of violence 
occurring in Tanjungbalai. In addition, this article is 
not the sole source of violence. There are other 
factors which can cause communal violence. 
However, religion provides doctrines, ideologies, 
rituals, symbols, metaphors, discourses that can 
easily be used, misused, or manipulated by people 
(such as actor of violence, agents or managers of 
conflict and interest groups) immaterial interest (Al 
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Result and Discussion 
1. The Brief Chronology of the Riots 
Although news reports about the incident at 
Tanjungbalai offer many perspectives of outsiders 
about their first glimpse. According to Jakarta Globe: 
the rioting on the Buddhist temples in Tanjungbalai, 
a city near Indonesia's fourth-biggest city of Medan, 
start on Saturday when resident were reportedly 
angry at a woman of Chinese descent who allegedly 
protested againts a mosque using loudspeakers to 
broadcast calls to prayer in front of her house 
(Fawnia, 2016). This view was agreed by many 
people that the riots were based on the issue of voice 
speakers protested by Chinese Indonesian women. 
According to National Commision of Human Right 
(HAM, 2016a) suspected the riot caused by a 
resident of Tanjungbalai town who objected to the 
volume of adzan voice from a mosque in front of his 
house which then triggered the anger of the residents. 
Meanwhile, North Sumatera Police spokeperson Sr. 
Comr. Rina Sari Ginting said that riot occurred when 
41-year-old Chinese chinese ladies identified as 
Meliana, reprimanded and administrator of the Al 
Makshum Mosque to lower microphone volume 
(Gunawan, 2016). The meeting of Mosque officials 
of Al-Makhsum and Meliana  triggered tension and 
forced the police to secure Meliana and her husband 
at the police station. The mob was angry and pelted 
Meliana's house and but the attempt to set fire to his 
house was prevented by the police who were there. 
According to Rina, the mob attempted to set ablaze 
the vihara but the police managed to prevent them. 
They could only pelt the house of wording with 
projectiles, damaging it. This is the start of the 
anarchic acts “People are angry then destroy the 
Juanda Vihara located approximately 500 meters 
from the house Meliana” (Gunawan, 2016).  
Riot broke out in Tanjungbalai, North Sumatra 
allegedly due to provocation done by unscrupulous 
elements through social media. Mass emotion that 
has been unstoppable again finally burned a number 
of places of worship around the site (Panjaitan, 
2016). At the same time, the masses began to gather 
together, led by student group elements. Here, the 
mass with students doing protest to the Chinese 
women. Furthermore, the masses are encouraged to 
order and had to disperse. Allegedly  this mass 
gathered due to information through social media 
(facebook) posted by one of the activists (Panjaitan, 
2016). This opinion was confirmed by The Chief of 
National Police, General Tito Karnavian, suspecting 
“the incident in Tanjungbalai was caused by 
misscommunication. A person who is of minority 
ethnic may have said some things that upset other 
resident during azan” (News, 2016).  
Explanation about the trigger of violence above 
can be taken important factor that is religion in 
general become symbolic and retoric factor 
escalating the conflict in Tanjungbalai. However 
religion in this case is only a symptom that tends to 
see it as an instrument for provokating a widespread 
issue in social media involving students and youths 
who are active in cyberspace to engage in action. 
 
2. Demographic Overview and Introduction to 
Tanjungbalai Culture 
The Province of North Sumatra (North Sumatra) 
is one of the largest provinces in Indonesia in terms 
of population and area. The largest city in North 
Sumatra is Medan, as its capital. According to census 
records, the population of North Sumatera reached in 
2010 a total of 12,985,075 people. North Sumatra 
also represents the diversity of its people in terms of 
race, ethnicity and religion. Population of North 
Sumatra recorded consists of various ethnicities such 
as Batak (Toba, Pakpak Simalungun Karo and 
Angkola), Nias, Malay, Java, Aceh, Minagkabau, 
Tamil, Tionghoa, and several other ethnicities that all 
spread throughout the region of North Sumatra 
(Padang, 2011).  
Among the areas that quite represent the 
diversity of the people of North Sumatra is the City 
of Tanjungbalai. The city of Tanjungbalai is a city 
near Indonesia's fourth-biggest city of Medan. 
According to the 2010 census, the data shows the 
spread of tribes in Tanjungbalai consisting of 15.14% 
Malay, Batak 42.56%, Minang 3.58%, Java 17.06%, 
Aceh 1.11%, China 9.33%, Nias 0, 15%, Madura 8, 
39%, karo 0.73%. While based on religion, the 
population in the city of Tanjungbalai consists of: 
81.99% Islam, 7.78 Protestants, 1.06 Catholics, 9.07 
Buddhists, 0.08 Hindu, 0.02 others (BPS 
Tanjungbalai 2010). These data show that the 
demographic condition of the people in Tanjungbalai 
is still dominated by Muslims. However, the spread 
of religion is quite evenly distributed. For the scale 
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of Indonesian society in general, the percentage of 
religious minorities exceeding 5% can be considered 
a unique diversity phenomenon in compare with 
other regions in Sumatra. 
Another important factor for depicting people in 
North Sumatra is also the worker's level. Based on 
the projection result, the population in Tanjungbalai 
City in 2016 amounted to 169,084 people consisting 
of 85,213 male and 83,871 female population with 
36 households, 151 households spread over six 
objects. 50.39% male (Balai, 2017b). The working 
age population of 2015 in Tanjungbalai (15 years old 
) is 110,888 of this amount 64.83 percent of them or 
71,893 people are classified as labor and the rest are 
classified as non-labor. Of 71,893 residents of the 
city of Tanjungbalai which includes the labor, 64,659 
people or 89.94 percent of whom work and the rest 
of 7,234 people are open unemployment (Balai, 
2017c). 
According to the data of Tanjungbalai City's 
public employment level In 2015, the most dominant 
sectors absorbing labor in Balai Tanjungbalai are 
from trade, hotel and restaurant sector, 
ommunications and financial and services which 
absorb 77.83 percent (86. 273 people) of the aged 15 
and older who are employed, while the rest is 
absorbed in the agricultural sector 6.02 percent 
(6,672 persons) and the secondary mining and 
quarrying sector, Industry, electricity, gas and water 
and construction reach 16.11 percent (17,840 
people). From the 2015 data show that most workers 
have not/have not attended school/not/ have not 
graduated from primary school. There are 29.17 
percent (18,860 people) of high school education 
workers, while diploma/university-educated workers 
are a small percentage of 1.86 percent (1,200 people) 
of the total working population. In total there are still 
10.17 percent (6,576 people) workers who have not / 
have not attended school/no/have not graduated from 
elementary school (Balai, 2017a). 
Looking at above data on the level of 
community working in Tanjungbalai City, it shows 
that the dominant workers are in the trade and 
services sector. According to Irwansyah (2013, p. 
163) the success of ethnic Chinese in doing business 
and mastering the economy is unlikely to be offset 
by indigenous people. The shipowner of “Tongkang” 
is almost all Chinese, only one “Malay” has a 
“Barge” ship, and even then there is only one 
remained. Compared to Christianity, the jealousy of 
Buddhism is stronger due to the Chinese domination 
of the economy in almost every sectors. This fact was 
also conveyed by Nasution (2005, p. 90) that in the 
field of hotel service and Bengawan restaurant, the 
fact shows that those are owned by the Chinese while 
the native community as the worker. This note is 
interesting that the dominance of ethnic Chinese who 
controls trade shows that there is an economic 
disparity in society. 
 
3. A Suppression of the Religion and Race 
The religious factor as the dominant cause of 
violence is also recognized by Nasaruddin Umar 
(Muslim Figures) in his interview with MetroTV. He 
asserts there is an indication that inclusive Buddhism 
is not represented by Meliana as a Buddhist 
(Metrotvnews, 2016). Subsequently, Umar empahize 
that the religious factor is more dominant as an 
instrument for the violence. However Nasaruddin 
also acknowledges that there is a geographical role 
of coastal communities that tend to be heterogeneous 
and open. This also make is more potential for 
disputes (Metrotvnews, 2016). In line with that, 
Suhadi Sanjaya (Buddhist figure) also emphasized 
the role of religion as a motivator for peaceful life is 
not work optimally. Sanjaya blame the religions as 
the instrument factor for triggering inter-religious 
conflict in community (Metrotvnews, 2016). 
However, either Umar or Sanjaya do not show what 
aspect of religion might tend to the conflict. 
If the religious figure above emphasizes the 
dominant religious factor causing violence, then this 
opinion is also in line with the comments of the 
Governor of North Sumatra in his interview with 
Kompas TV (KOMPASTV, 2016a). Tengku 
Governor Erry Nuradi revealed that riot occurred 
because of a trigger caused by sentimental comments 
from a Buddhist Chinese women against the volume 
of azan in Muslim place of worship (Mushalla) near 
her house (KOMPASTV, 2016b). This view 
reinforces that the dominant factor in the form of 
religious symbols such as mosques, muslim ritual 
(prayer), azan as symbolic values in the Islamic 
religion triggered the Muslim community to fight 
againts other community. 
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The above data show that the significance that 
Buddhists have triggered the Islamic group's 
offended so that Muslim-majority citizens in the area 
play a role in making religious symbols and identities 
the basis of the riot. This confirms that religion 
becomes the frame of the violence. This fact is 
confirmed by a circular of the Fatwa Commission of 
the Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) of North 
Sumatera (North Sumatra) officially regarding the 
blasphemy of Islam by Meliana in Tanjungbalai City. 
In the first fatwa in 2017, the MUI of North Sumatra 
established a religious blasphemy committed by 
Meliana in the town of Tanjungbalai (Rahma, 2017). 
However, what appears to be a religious war on is 
closing analysis is not the only factor that can be 
recognized as a trigger for conflict. Therefore this 
simplistic and reductionist opinion is inadequate. 
 
4. The Political and Economic Interest 
Previous works on Tanjungbalai riot have 
focused on the historical-social roots of violence, 
highlighting how and why previously peaceful and 
peaceful religious community conflicts are now 
beginning to reveal symptoms of social vulnerability. 
They argue that religion is used as a symptom, but 
the act is really motivated by material-based political 
interest and socio-economic reason. Among these 
opinions is Surya (2017) which discusses the 
problem of diversity in society that can cause 
conflict. According to him, this complexity is not 
only a matter of religion but also political affiliation, 
economic motives, and different cultural 
orientations. 
Mulyartono et al (n.d.) asserted that there is a 
hateful spin as the causes of hatred among the people 
in Tanjungbalai. Mulyartono et al considered the 
process of escalation of the conflict occurred due to 
the hate and disguised spin that had been missed. 
This study then argues that the hate spin is effective 
because it is supported by a range of factors such as 
previous conflict history, economic anxiety, social 
interaction patterns other than primarily acts of state 
actors. 
A more explicit analysis by Fawnia (2016) 
suggests, although on the surface it appears to be a 
religious issue, more people suspect unrest due to 
ethnic sentiment or economic inequality. He 
reasoned that Tanjungbalai was closer to the 
predominantly Chinese-Indonesian field. According 
to Fawnia there are indications that the Chinese 
population in Tanjungbalai that often employ local 
people in their businesses indicates a general 
economic gap. Chinese businessmen explain one 
report that the fact is true that Chinese living in the 
region are better than the indigenous people. This 
view is simmilar with Harahap (2017) who 
concluded that in this conflict,  the economic interest 
and power issues of each group play significantly to 
optimize influence and control the relations between 
groups. Basically, according to him, this is a struggle 
of domination. Harahap here emphasizes the identity 
politics as well as the political economy struggle. 
Yew-Foong (2016) considers that at the social 
level, low education, socio-economic stagnancy and 
job-related inequalities also contribute as a factor to 
unfavorable episodes as well. religion is used as a 
protector of public reforestation for such vengeance. 
Besides the fact factor of Chinese people's general 
superiority in economic factors, as well as in other 
parts of Indonesian society are starting to fear that 
they will start to dominate politics as well. 
To conclude, scholars of the Tanjungbalai 
conflict have generally emphasized the political role 
of state consitutional change on political oppurtunity 
for citizens to have equal rights to gain political 
positions in the government including previous 
Chinese groups experiencing marginalization. 
 
5. Local Muslim-Buddha Tension 
Ethnic violence in Indonesia experienced 
different symptoms post 1998 where rampant 
violence in the name of religion as a veil of various 
other factors behind (Schiller & Garang, 2002).
 The issue at Tanjungbalai is not the first 
time. In 2010 the comfort of Buddhists was disturbed 
by several mass organizations who were acting on 
behalf of the United Islamic Movement  (Gerakan 
Islam Bersatu) to demonstrate to the offices of the 
DPRD and Mayor of Tanjungbalai. They urged the 
government to bring down the Buddha Statue at the 
Tri Ratna Monastery. they reasoned that the 
existence of the statue does not reflect the Islamic 
impression in Tanjungbalai City and can disrupt 
harmony in the midst of society (Irwansyah, 2013, p. 
162). Irwansyah pointed out that social conflict 
occurred after the establishment of the statue of 
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Buddha is the main factor that is streotype 
dominating sentiment in a society where Buddhist 
perceptions similar to China actually have the 
potential to crack the Muslim-Buddhist social 
relationship in Tanjungbalai. According to 
Irwansyah (2013, p. 163), the political identity factor 
is strongly characterized by the suspicion that ethnic 
Chinese want to make Tanjungbalai a “Buddish 
Chinese City”. 
According to Mustagfirin (2012) when 
commenting on the issue of Buddha statue decline 
caused by two things that is because they are the 
fourth largest tribe and control the economy. 
Heterogeneous potentials affect the Malay and 
Chinese conflict Islam vs Buddha. In Nasution's 
(2005, p. 90) research, Bengawan's hotels and 
restaurants are owned by Chinese and indigenous as 
Chinese workers in Tanjungbalai, their numbers are 
small but the economy is controlled by all of them. 
This resulted in the magnificence of the Buddhist 
temple buildings compared to the Great Mosque of  
Tanjungbalai that had long been neglected. So there 
is a tendency to strengthen local Muslim-Buddhist 
tension in Tanjungbalai.  
This historical factor further emphasizes that 
there is a background conflict of dominance between 
Islam and Buddhism in Tanjungbalai. The opinion 
about the dominant factor that caused the conflict in 
Tanjungbalai as an ethno-religious conflict was 
raised by National Commission of Human Rights 
(HAM, 2016b) report in 2016. Komnas HAM 
believes that there has been destruction and burning 
of houses of worship and homes ethnic hatred 
(HAM, 2016c). Komnas HAM in this case further 
strengthen the factor of ethnicity as the cause of the 
destruction and burning of houses and houses of 
ethnic Chinese worship. 
 
Conclusion 
There are indications that the unique conflict in 
Tanjungbalai is no dominant factor. It seems clear 
that there are emerging subjects who want to 
articulate their identity to the public sphere. Not 
because they have been dominated by the 
government but an opportunity for them to fight. 
This article acknowledges that there has been a 
trigger to violence caused by religion that occurred 
in Tanjungbalai in 2016. However, it is too simplistic 
and reductionist to say that there is only one factor 
that led to the event. This article concludes that the 
riots on Tanjungbalai are nestled in a complex web 
of local tension, religious differences, economic-
political interests, inter ethnic conflict and symbolic 
representations including identity politic and also 
roumors in social media. 
I realizes that religion plays a role in triggering 
for the conflict. The religious factor  provides a 
powerful and effective force in mobilizing the 
masses from other collective identities as Scott 
Appleby (2012, pp. 57–61) says that religious loyalty 
is able to translate the religious identity and symbols 
of society so as to ignore rational calculations, at the 
same time religion are indeed manufactured or 
invented within particular historical and political 
contexts. If religion is recognized as influential in the 
dynamics of violence, it affirms that religion is not 
the only factor that causes violence, in other words 
not the dominant factor in conflict and violence. If 
religion becomes a trigger and a symptom of conflict 
at the surface level then the same can also be to other 
factors such as economic, political, social and so 
forth. This is in line with what Cavanaugh (2011, p. 
685) said that war and violence are not the struggles 
between religion and secularism, but between the 
two skewed visions of social order that are both, in 
different ways, sacred. 
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